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HPX/Ivanhoe Atlantic slams Guinea $20 billion railway: says 'American company cannot use Chinese infrastructure'

  • Talafah T. Tabolo
  • 4 minutes ago
  • 3 min read

HPX/Ivanhoe Atlantic CEO Bronwyn Barnes
HPX/Ivanhoe Atlantic CEO Bronwyn Barnes

By Insights Staff Reporter


HPX/Ivanhoe Atlantic’s (IA) stealthy rejection of Guinea’s $20 billion railway and in-house justification that an American Company cannot use a “Chinese infrastructure” is a calculated, self‑serving act of geopolitical arbitrage. Our investigation seeks to expose the lies and hypocrisies driving IA’s media and lobbying campaign, which is designed to secure a cheaper, faster route for a project that could generate up to $9 billion in profit.


The Hypocrisy of the “Anti‑China” Stance


IA’s claim that an “American company” cannot use Chinese infrastructure is a deliberate distortion of its own commercial reality. Across its wider group, Ivanhoe’s business model relies heavily on Chinese capital and Chinese demand.


At Kamoa‑Kakula in the DRC, Chinese mining giant Zijin is a core partner, and the vast majority of smelter output is locked into long‑term offtake contracts with Chinese entities such as CITIC Metal and Zijin subsidiaries. At Kipushi, Chinese buyers are contracted to take most of the zinc concentrates, backed by advance‑payment facilities that ease Ivanhoe’s working‑capital burden.


In other words, when Chinese money and markets boost returns—as in the DRC and South Africa—China is embraced. It is only when Chinese‑built infrastructure in Guinea comes with higher costs and delays that IA suddenly claims it is politically unacceptable.


The Economic Reality: The Trans‑Guinean Penalty


The real driver of IA’s position is not ideology but economics. Guinea’s sovereignty policy—requiring ore to move via the Trans‑Guinean Railway—effectively wipes out the profitability edge of the short Liberian route. IA’s preferred Liberian option relies on rehabilitating roughly 240 km of existing line at an estimated $1.8 billion, providing the cheapest and fastest path to cash flow and a post‑tax NPV estimated at $9 billion.


By contrast, complying with Conakry’s mandate means funding a new spur into a $20 billion national corridor and accepting a haul of roughly 650–700 km to the coast. That implies an additional multi‑billion‑dollar capital burden plus far higher long‑term operating costs tied to debt repayment on the new line. The short Liberian route is simply the lowest‑cost monetization path; the “Chinese infrastructure” argument is cover for avoiding the Trans‑Guinean penalty.


The Critical Minerals Facade


IA’s anti‑China messaging doubles as a sophisticated lobbying tool in Washington, crafted to tap into U.S. fears about critical minerals and supply‑chain security. But this facade has failed on the core technical point. The U.S. Department of the Interior’s 2022 and 2025 Critical Minerals Lists do not include iron ore. Those lists are reserved for minerals that are both economically vital and at heightened risk of supply disruption; iron ore is treated as a widely available bulk commodity, even though steel is strategically essential. IA’s lobbying—fronted by Dan Vajdich of Yorktown Solutions—did not succeed in rewriting that definition.


As a result, iron ore’s exclusion undercuts the argument for U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) support and forces IA to lean even harder on geopolitical rhetoric where statutory reality is against it.


Legality and Sovereignty: The Unresolved Risk


The legal and political risks around the Liberian route remain fundamentally unresolved, no matter how attractive the economics look on paper. Guinea has explicitly mandated that all Simandou‑linked ore must exit via the Trans‑Guinean Railway, framing this as a question of national sovereignty and consistent with the 2021 transshipment framework.


IA does not have the prior written authorization from Guinea that would allow exports through Liberia. Any rail and port agreement ratified in Monrovia without that consent is, in Conakry’s eyes, a legal nullity. By pushing ahead regardless, IA invites the most severe sanction available to the Guinean state: suspension or withdrawal of its Kon Kweni mining permit. The projected $5–$9 billion profit is entirely contingent on Guinea’s sovereign approval—a leverage point IA is recklessly gambling with, while selling the dispute to Western audiences as a morality play about “American” versus “Chinese” infrastructure.



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